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Abstract 
The Phalanx Close-In Weapon System, (CIWS), was built as a terminal defense 
against current and evolving anti-ship missiles and aircraft which penetrate outer fleet 
air defense envelopes. Phalanx has evolved since then. Lower operational availability, 
escalating costs, and inadequate funding have prompted researchers and the Phalanx 
Program Office to conduct studies to examine certain aspects of the system. A 
comprehensive study was needed to look at all aspects of the program that will gauge 
the status of the current conditions, analyze the cost structures, examine the initiatives 
in place, and suggest areas which need further investigation. The objective of this report 
is to identify the weapon system’s problem areas, if any exist. This report evaluates the 
status of and suggests research studies for improvement of the life-cycle support of the 
Phalanx weapon system. Evaluation is completed by reviewing the literature, analyzing 
the data, and communicating with the persons knowledgeable with the system. 
Exploring the conflict in the system and identifying the underlying performance drivers is 
the important objective of this research study.  
Key Words: Phalanx, optimization, operational availability, reliability metric, 
casualty reports, life cycle support. 
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Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) was built as a terminal defense 
against current and evolving anti-ship missiles and aircraft which penetrate outer fleet 
air defense envelopes. It is designed to defend against small, high-speed surface crafts, 
helicopters, and general purpose aircraft in open waters, coastal waters or in port 
[Dutton 2003]. 
CIWS, designed and built by Raytheon Corporation, is a fast-reaction, rapid-fire, 
computer-controlled system with radar and Gatling gun designed to engage Anti-Ship 
Missiles (ASM). It is equipped to search, provide detection, threat evaluation, target 
acquisition, tracking, firing, target destruction evaluation, automatic kill assessment, and 
cease-fire data to control train, elevation, and discharge of the weapon. Thus, CIWS is a 
complex device which engages in multiple functions often performed by separate and 
independent systems. Operational tests and evaluations were performed when CIWS 
was first installed on board USS Bigelow in 1977. The device exceeded maintenance 
and reliability specification at that time [Dutton PEO Document].  
CIWS has evolved substantially since then. Since 1980, the original Block 0 has 
been improved multiple times. Changes include: Block 1 Baseline/L0 in 1988, Block 1 
Baseline/L1 in 1991, Block 1 Baseline/L2 in 1992, Block 1A in 1996, and Block 1B in 
1999 [RM&A Handbook 2004]. The Phalanx overhaul program then began to accept 
Block 0 mounts and replace them with improved Block 1 systems. Prior to this, in the 
early nineties, Naval Ordnance Station/Louisville (NOSL) began to perform a thorough 
Class A overhaul. Such an overhaul included a complete teardown, stripping, 
resurfacing, painting, and individual testing of the mounts. The reliability of the post-
overhaul systems was as good as the benchmark of the Block 0 production systems 
and was greatly improved in comparison to the older systems. CIWS was upgraded as 
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Due to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, in 1995, NOSL 
Louisville depot was scheduled for closure. Instead, it was purchased by the state of 
Kentucky and leased to the primary contractor for the CIWS overhaul program. The total 
ownership cost statements [LeClaire 2003], the expenditure of funds [Chaparro 2003], 
and the funding history [CIWS Funding History PEO Document] of the CIWS system all 
suggest the costs for overhauls escalated, while sponsor funding for the program 
became erratic. The funding issues and the soaring costs forced the Class A overhauls 
to be replaced by Class B overhauls. Class B overhauls are substantially reduced in 
scope compared to Class A overhauls. They are also not preset procedures, but are 
flexible to the observed condition of the mounts. 
The class B overhaul effort that started in 1999 and has been in fleet use for 
three years has not met expectations in service reliability [Dutton 2003] or cost. During 
the period 1998–2002, overall ownership cost increased 53%.  From FY02 costs to the 
projected cost in FY03, costs increased 28% [Chaparro 2003]. However, funding during 
these years was not steadily increasing. Instead, the numbers were erratic: $47.26M in 
1999, $21.76M in 2000, $46.17M in 2001.  
1.2 Literature Survey 
Lower operational availability, escalating costs, and inadequate funding have 
prompted researchers and the Phalanx Program Office to conduct studies to examine 
the condition of the system. Electrical and mechanical problems have been examined; 
cost assessments—such as total ownership cost, overhaul cost, and spending 
patterns—have been addressed; likewise, some marginal analysis of the cost-versus-
potential-benefits has also been performed.  
In his analysis for the CIWS Overhaul Program, Mr. Dutton, of the Program 
Executive Office Integrated Weapon System (PEO IWS), describes the basics of the 
weapon system. The document includes the mission and the performance of the 
system, evolution of the system, the last twenty years of data on the fleet population, 
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In his document [Current Fleet Phalanx Population PEO Document], the current fleet 
population is described in detail. In a CIWS business case [Dutton 2003], Mr. Dutton 
assesses the costs and potential benefits of various overhaul strategies intended to 
restore the CIWS system. This case study concludes that Class A overhauls provide the 
most favorably reliable improvements for the cost; the case also asserts the optimal 
interval for overhauls for service reliability is seven years. Michael R. Chaparro, in his 
MBA professional report at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), analyzes the 
spending patterns associated with the CIWS program [Chaparro 2003]. The acquisition 
plan for the weapon system for the next few years and the various initiatives (both in 
place and proposed) are explained in Dutton’s 1995 document. This plan explains the 
need for, as well as the objective of, the program, the monetary, business, technical, 
and logistical considerations, and the plan of action for FY05 in production, 
procurement, and design.  
The CIWS handbook [RM&A Handbook 2004] is also an invaluable resource for 
researchers. The definitions, metrics, and analysis of various fiscal and operative 
aspects described in the handbook were extremely helpful for the above reports. In 
addition, it provides valuable information on Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability 
(R, M, & A). The handbook is the single common source of information for the CIWS 
community. It identifies major issues and the corrective actions, funding shortfalls and 
their effects. It concludes by describing the initiatives currently in place to improve the 
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) for the CIWS system.  
Other documents are vital to understanding the CIWS system and its fiscal 
repercussions. The information about CIWS’s funding history is given in the CIWS 
Funding History PEO Document. The total ownership cost study, written by LCDR Jeff 
LeClaire of the Phalanx Programs Office, compares the cost structures of FY98 with 
FY02 and tracks the changes for FY03 [LeClaire 2003]. In addition to the sources 
mentioned previously, several more records were reviewed to gain background 
information about Naval Warfare Systems in general and CIWS in particular: Cela 1994, 
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1.3 Motivation  
All the literature reviewed addresses certain aspects of the CIWS weapon 
program. A comprehensive study was needed to examine all aspects of the program, 
gauge the status of current conditions, analyze the cost structures, identify the initiatives 
in place, and suggest areas which need further investigation. This study set out to do 
just those things. The goal of the report is to provide recommendations to optimize the 
Life-support Cycle of the Phalanx Weapon System. The objective of this report is to 
identify, if any exist, problem areas for the weapon system. This report evaluates the 
status of and suggests research studies for improvement of the life-cycle support of the 
Phalanx weapon system. Evaluation is done by reviewing the literature, analyzing the 
data, and communicating with the persons well-informed about the system. Exploring 
the conflicts in the system and identifying the underlying performance drivers is the 
critical objective.  
After reviewing and analyzing some of the above-mentioned literature, and 
discussing the program history with knowledgeable persons, the researcher found the 
financial and operational problems became evident. The primary reason for the financial 
difficulty is the uncertainty of funding. But this uncertainty may be alleviated if initiatives 
are in place for optimally allocating the given funds. Lack of funding leads to operational 
constraints. Misguided strategy, untrained personnel, and/or system operators 
misinformed about the root cause also lead to operational issues. Due to the 
complexity, the size, the maturity, and the diversity of the CIWS system, no single 
measure can correct any of the problems that exist. 
This report is arranged as follows. In the second section, the report gives the 
overview of the status of the weapon system. Then, it discusses the performance 
drivers of the financial and operational issues and describes their interrelationship. In 
the third section, the report suggests recommendations on how to improve the system 
utilizing initiatives that are already in place and by conducting further investigations. 
Here, the report describes the tools available to be used as probes and also proposes 
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the fourth section by stating specific research studies recommended for CIWS in the 
future. The fifth section lists the referenced documentation. 
2. Anatomy of the System 
2.1 Overview 
The CIWS is a complex, mature, large, and diverse weapon system. Phalanx is 
designed to search, detect, and evaluate threats, acquire target, track, fire, and evaluate 
target destruction, provide automatic kill assessment, and process the data.  Any 
system this complex has numerous interdependencies which are, by their very nature, 
difficult to analyze. Scrutinizing every area concurrently is not easily done. At the same 
time, analyzing just one aspect provides a skewed picture. It is possible to look at the 
bigger picture; yet, this solution may mask the depth of the problem and, therefore, the 
actual cause. Secondly, the maturity of the system exacerbates the problem since the 
last minute “band-aid” solutions over the years have never solved the real issues. The 
traditional procedures, though outdated, are hard to change due to resistance and lack 
of expertise. Thirdly, the large population of the system magnifies the small increase in 
cost to large proportions across the system. Finally, the diversity of the system (due to 
different baselines) creates unique status of the mounts. This in turn creates unique 
problems. Currently, CIWS has 158 ships, 308 mounts, and 6 baselines. The different 
baselines for all these mounts necessitate increased logistical complexity to provide 
necessary spares; this complexity likewise causes increased lack of availability of the 
maintenance expertise on the ship, and places a heavy burden on inventory managers 
to carry the required spare parts. 
However, this interdependent complexity also suggests that solving one problem 
will help cure many of the difficulties caused by the root problem. Thus, probing deeper 
and investigating further to isolate such a problem is worth the time and resources. The 
maturity of the system suggests such data is available. After collecting and assembling 
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structure may be possible. Though the large population of the system magnifies small 
cost increases, it also suggests that small savings will result in large cost reductions. 
While the issue of multiple baselines is currently being addressed, this problem will not 
be solved until all the mounts are brought to the same standard. 
The CIWS, based on the literature reviewed, data analyzed so far, and 
communication with PEO IWS personnel, seems to be caught in a vicious circle of high 
cost and low availability. Low availability leads to high-cost maintenance, which leads to 
higher costs, which in turn prompts budget cuts, all of which result in further reduction in 
operational availability.  This downward spiral has been going on for at least the last ten 
years. Likewise, the lack of funds reduces the preventive maintenance budget, which 
lowers availability, which forces high-cost corrective maintenance. This clearly escalates 
the costs. This is a commonly observed problem with many systems. The CIWS, as 
noted earlier, is a complex, mature, and high-population weapon system with diverse 
baselines; therefore, the problem is more pronounced in relation to it than in some other 
systems. To analyze this cyclical syndrome, the CIWS was mapped into a hypergraph 
of observations that needs further analysis and investigation. Figure 1 shows this 
mapped hypergraph. Subsets of this hypergraph will be analyzed in succeeding 
paragraphs.  
At the center is the “high-cost/low-availability” syndrome. Green arrows lead to 
the observations that need more specific analysis. Red arrows suggest more in-depth 
investigations of the current status. Black arrows point out the initiatives in place. The 
following subsections discuss the influential factors and performance drivers for this 
syndrome and are illustrated using sub-hypergraphs of the graph in Figure 1 (labeled 
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2.2 Performance Drivers 
2.2.1 Cost Analysis 








Preliminary analysis of Total Ownership Cost (TOC) based on both Chaparro and 
LeClaire’s research led to Tables 1, 2, and 3. These tables compare the costs of the In-
Service Engineering Agent (ISEA), the Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP), and an 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) Depot. These costs are analyzed based on the 
premise that operational availability, Ao, is driven by Mean Logistic Delay Time (MLDT), 
which in turn is driven by Mean Supply Response Time (MSRT), and Mean Outside 
Assistance Delay Time (MOADT). The functional entities contributing to MSRT and 
MOADT are the ISEA, NAVICP, and OEM Depot.  
Based on Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) data, Table 1, the cost for 
ISEA activities increased 7% from FY98 to FY02. The projected cost for FY03 indicated 
a rise of 40.5% in one year. NAVICP cost increased a whopping 299% from FY98 to 
FY02, whereas the projected cost increase for FY03 only rose by 28.8%. Similar 
increases are observed for the OEM Depot: 269.1% from FY98 to FY02 and 23.1% for 
projected FY03. Review of Chaparro’s 2003 research showed similar increases; these 
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point to a similar trend: large increases from FY98 to FY02 but slightly lower increases 
for projected FY03. The only discrepancy between the two sources is for the NAVICP 
data.  
Table 1: Observations based on NAVSEA Total Ownership Cost Data 
Department Change from FY 98 to FY 02 Change from FY 02 to projected FY 03
ISEA + 7% + 40.5% 
NAVICP + 299% + 28.8% 
OEM Depot + 269.1% + 23.1% 
 
Table 2: Observations based on Total Ownership Cost Data from Chaparro 2003 
Department Change from FY 98 to FY 02 Change from FY 02 to projected FY 03
ISEA + 12% + 42.6% 
NAVICP + 39.9% + 23.8% 
OEM Depot + 286% + 23.6% 
 
Table 3: Comparison between TOC of NAVSEA and Data from Cela 2004 
Change from FY 98 to FY 02 Change from FY 02 to projected FY 
03 
Department 
NAVSEA [Chaparro 2003] NAVSEA [Chaparro 2003] 
ISEA + 7% + 12% + 40.5% + 42.6% 
NAVICP + 299% + 39.9% + 28.8% + 23.8% 
OEM Depot + 269.1% + 286% + 23.1% + 23.6% 
 
In addition to the total ownership costs described in tables 1 – 3, the categorized 
costs in Chaparro’s 2003 document convey that the government material cost 
decreased from FY98 to FY02 and was to increase 371% in projected FY03. The 
contractor material numbers and travel costs from FY98 to FY02 are not available, but 
they rose an amazing 1046% from FY02 to projected FY03. These increases in costs 
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2.2.2 Cost of Overhauls 







Phalanx mounts have parts that are ‘limited life’ parts. Therefore, as the mounts 
are maintained, these parts have to be replaced. Class A overhauls include complete 
replacement of each of these parts during the conversion of the mounts to Block 1B. For 
this reason, Class A overhauls are more expensive than Class B overhauls. Class B 
overhauls conduct maintenance based on the condition of the part. If a part seems in 
satisfactory condition, it is not replaced. It often happens that this part is at the end of its 
lifecycle. Then, when a “newly” overhauled mount is used, the part fails, thus reducing 
the operational availability. Therefore, though more expensive than Class B overhauls, 
Class A overhauls are generally justified.  
The Class A overhauls are performed as follows: older mounts are worked on at 
the depot in a production line. The parts are stripped, cleaned, painted, etc. It takes 
about two years to completely process the mounts. Depending on the ship’s availability, 
these overhauled mounts are installed on a ship that can be spared for the installation. 
However, it is important to note that mounts removed from one ship are not necessarily 
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2.2.3 Casualty Reports and Parts on Board  








There is a clear relation between casualty reports (CASREPs) and the status of 
parts needed [RM&A Handbook  2004]. A critical fact is that the parts that cause 
CASREPs are mostly the problem parts which are replaced in Class A overhauls.  
The causes behind these effects need extra analysis. Some of the factors 
included in this domino effect are: an increase in the percentage of not-on-board (NOB) 
parts, and high-quality parts replaced by on-board low-quality parts [RM&A Handbook 
2004]. Along the same lines, multiple CASREPs caused by the same class of defective 
parts have multiple causes-and-effects. Defective parts have to be replaced. They have 
to be replaced by parts available on board. Sometimes the available parts are of lower 
grade. This leads to more and frequent CASREPs. Using low grade on board repair 
parts (OBRP) will cause this cycle of broken-replace-broken to continue. CASREPs will 
increase. And, though the days to casualty-corrected reports (CASCOR) will decrease, 
that seemingly-quick reaction time will not improve the reliability of the system, since the 
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2.2.4 Escalating Costs 









The total cost visibility of a system is often compared with an iceberg [Blanchard 
6th Edition]. When a system is acquired, in addition to the acquisition cost, the cost of 
logistics for life-cycle support should be considered from the beginning and not after-
the-fact. Figure 2 shows various hidden costs. To name just a few, these costs are 
operation, maintenance, supply support, and training costs.  
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If these costs are not considered for the system at the beginning, the 
maintenance takes a back seat due to lack of funding. Marginal maintenance then leads 
to supportability issues.   
Figure 3 depicts this issue for both a system with early emphasis on 
supportability and for a system without this feature [Blanchard 6th Edition]. As systems 
mature, the supportability costs start gaining magnitude. Following this same trend, after 
almost twenty years since installation, costs of Class A overhauls for CIWS started to 
escalate starting in1995 [Dutton 2003 and 1995].  








After the initial installation, the CIWS began to be upgraded as the needs of the 
Navy and defense strategy of the government changed. The Block 1 upgrades were 
completed at NOSL. As stated previously, in 1995, under the BRAC process, NOSL 
was selected to close. However, the facility was purchased by the state of Kentucky and 
leased to the primary contractor to continue the overhaul program. Perhaps due to the 
depot transition, or to reasons that need additional investigation, the costs for overhauls 
escalated immediately. Such high cost normally leads to reduction in funding, which 
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increased cost for Class A overhauls resulted in a decision to downgrade to Class B 
overhauls 
2.2.5 The Reliability Metric 






The reliability literature [Blanchard 6th Edition] and the Military Handbook for 
Operational Reliability [Operational Availability Handbook OPNAVINST] define Ao, 
operational availability, as the quotient of “up time” over “total time.” This equation is the 
performance measurement of a system. 
MLDTMTTRMTBF
MTBFAo ++=  
Equation 1. Performance Measurement of a System 
MTBF is the mean time between failures. MTTR is mean time to repair, which can be 
further explained as “time it takes to remove interference, remove, replace, and test the 
failed component, return the equipment to its original condition, and replace and retest 
any system interference removed to get to the failed equipment.” MLDT, or mean 
logistic delay time, is the cumulative time required by all logistics processes to support 
the requisite repair.   
The reviewed literature about the CIWS suggests that MTBF has been 
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vs. the age of the system is well documented. The initiatives for improving MTBF are 
also in place. As upgrades for CIWS have been introduced, MTBF has increased 
[Dutton 2003, RM&A Handbook]. As Table 4 suggests, the Phalanx MTBF (in other 
words, the system’s reliability) has significantly increased; however, MLDT also has 
increased. These combinations result in a fairly constant Ao trend [RM&A Handbook 
2004]. Program manager demand factors (PMDF), metrics for anti-air warfare (AAW) 
and anti-surface warfare (ASUW), compared over FY01–FY03 are given in Table 4.  
Table 4: Comparison of MTBF and MLDT for AAW and ASUW   
AAW      ASUW 
 01 02 03  01 02 03 
Ao 0.75 0.65 0.81  0.74 0.69 0.72 
MTBF 561 649 795  693 622 549 
MLDT 136 220 142  122 150 174 
 
2.2.6 Casualty Reports 
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The data for CIWS suggests that over the last 6-7 years, the number of 
CASREPs has increased by at least 5% [RM&A Handbook 2004]. The increase in 
CASREPs, as discussed previously, is proportional to the status of the parts, working 
and spare, and status of the inventory. But, in 2003, the percentage of mounts that were 
CASREP-free dropped from 95% to 90%. So, not only are there more CASREPs, but 
they are distributed across the fleet. Unfortunately, the problem of malfunction is not 
concentrated on a few ships.  
If there is insufficient expertise on board for the diagnosis of a malfunction or for 
replacing the part to correct the malfunction, CASREPs across the fleet will increase 
greatly. It is critical to note that, based on the data available, technical assistance 
requests have indeed increased [RM&A Handbook 20046]. In fact, the tech assist 
requests were about 0.3/system/year in 1997, and in 2003 were at least 
0.95/system/year. That is an increase of more than 300%. Supplementary investigation 
of the possible cause is clearly required.  
2.2.7 The Overhauls 








The correlation between CASREPs and the age of the mounts, though intuitive, 
is validated by data. Specifically, 71% CIWS mounts are 6 years or older. After the 
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increase in required overhauls. Hence, the more the time passes since overhaul, the 
more CASREPs occur. As more years pass after overhaul, costs escalate further. It 
should also be noted that Ao one year after the overhaul was 0.77, whereas 10 years 
after overhaul, it was 0.70. Therefore, Ao has decreased 10% in ten years. This fact 
must be put in context against the benchmark. But, there is no benchmark available for 
Ao. The decrease in Ao over 10 years, though explainable, should be studied for its 
impact on readiness. If the value of Ao immediately after overhaul could have been 
higher, then a drop of 10% in its value could have been sustainable and possibly 
acceptable in terms of readiness. 
MTBF, in the first year after overhaul, was 500. Yet, after ten years it is 350 
[RM&A Handbook 2004]. But, if MTBF is tracked using PMDF, then MTBF has 
increased from 450 in 1999 to 692 in 2003. MTBF also has increased from 561 in 2001 
to 795 in 2003 for AAW. In the case of ASUW, numbers have dropped from 693 to 549. 
All these different values of MTBF need to be put into perspective and analyzed for their 
actual impact on fleet readiness.  
3. The Cure 
3.1 Analysis of Influential Factors 
3.1.1 The Costs  
Various costs associated with CIWS need to be analyzed further to clarify their 
correlation with increases in overall costs over the years.  The ownership costs were 
recorded for FY98, FY02, and FY03. These are too few data points to project any trend. 
However, some patterns can be identified, and they lead to the following observations. 
The overhaul strategies for restoring Phalanx to original condition and to sustain 
life-cycle support suggest the cost-benefit analysis of such overhauls needs further 
examination. Though the marginal cost analysis for different overhauls (Class A, Class 
B, Class B + R & M ECPs, and Class B +CCAs + R & M ECPs) is recorded in detail in 
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would be beneficial as well. Supplemental study of the escalating costs since 1995 is 
vital. Were these increases due to outsourcing? Or did the inherent cost go up? Or, did 
the way costs were accounted for change? The answers to these questions can lead to 
reduction in cost. Along the same lines, there may be valuable lessons related to 
outsourcing here. 
3.1.2 The Reliability Metric 
The reliability literature dictates that improving MTBF does not necessarily 
improve Ao.  Recall Equation 1: 
MLDTMTTRMTBF
MTBFAo ++=   
MTBF appears in the numerator as well as in the denominator. So, changes in 
MTBF do not affect Ao necessarily. In that case, it may be preferable to analyze Ao 
instead of MTBF. Therefore, the choice of the reliability metric used needs to be 
investigated. It is important to note that there exists no specification for minimum Ao in 
Department of Defense (DoD) guidelines. Yet, Ao should be one of the Key Performance 
Parameters (KPP) [Boudreau et al 2003]. Without such performance measures in place, 
improving Ao is a futile endeavor. 
Equation 1 also includes MTTR in the denominator. This variable is normally a 
small number, so it does not influence Ao as much as other factors. This leaves mean 
logistic delay time (MLDT) to be the mathematical driver of Equation 1. MLDT includes 
Mean Supply Response Time (MSRT), Mean Administration Delay Time (MADT), and 
Mean Outside Assistance Delay Time (MOADT). Analysis so far suggests that MSRT, 
due to transportation from within and off the ship, especially with high percentage of 
NOBs and MOADT due to lack of expertise on board, have larger values. Therefore, to 
improve Ao, MLDT (and, consequently, MSRT and MOADT) should be improved. 
For example: consider an electronic system that has a certain component failing 
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small number for electronic systems, say, 3 hours in this case. MLDT, on the other 
hand, is measured in terms of days or weeks. Let MLDT be 3000 hours. This, by 
Equation 1, yields Ao to be 0.25. Keeping everything else the same, but introducing a 
significant improvement in reliability, say a 30% increase in MTBF, yields Ao to be 0.30. 
This is a 0.05 increase in operational availability which will go unnoticed in spite of a 
huge increase of reliability, because the supportability factors of the system remained 
the same. Therefore, once the system is fielded, increasing effectiveness of the logistics 
support pipeline is more effective for Ao than for the system reliability. As this example 
suggests, investigation of MSRT for the Phalanx system will uncover various issues 
leading to NOB parts increase in number of CASREPs, and CASCOR. 
The hypothesis that MSRT and MOADT are the drivers for MLDT, which in turn 
drives Ao, has to be tested and validated—especially if the costs associated with MSRT 
and MOADT are increasing; it is crucial these be researched further. The costs such as 
ISEA costs for systems, acquisition, engineering support, CIWS I & C spares, ordnance 
alteration (ORDALT), acquisition support, fleet modernization program (FMP) support, 
NAVICP support, performance based logistics (PBL), costs for defense logistic agency 
(DLA) procurement, storage and distribution of spare parts, and OEM Depot costs all 
need to be studied. As the system gets more mature, the deterioration of the mounts will 
progress. On the other hand, as years go by, acquired experience of the system should 
decrease MSRT and MOADT. Therefore, this aspect of Ao also needs specific attention. 
Some initiatives are in place for improving MTBF. Table 5 shows these initiatives, 
the cost for their improvement, the amount of improvement in MTBF, and the marginal 
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Table 5: MTBF Improvement Initiatives 
Initiatives Cost in Thousands Improvement in MTBF 
Class A Overhauls $700 400 Hours 
Back Fit $30 23 Hours 
SEARAM 
Shipboard rolling airframe missiles 
Dual Use Hardware 
$500 129 Hours 
CCA 
Circuit card assembly 
$72 (Total Saving 
Across the Fleet $752) 
23 Hours 
Gun and Ammo 
Handling 
$100 100 Hours 
Surface TV Camera $60 133 Hours 
3.1.3 Issues Driving CASREPs 
The evident correlation between CASREPs and certain parts in the mounts 
needs to be addressed. 80% of the problems are caused by 20% of the parts. The 
Class A overhauls replaces this 20% of the parts 100% of the time. In order to cut costs, 
replacing these with low-quality parts already on board will clearly increase the 
CASREPs. This occurrence needs additional investigation. Likewise, the correlation 
between CASREPs and Class A overhauls needs more data. 
Researching the status of the system at a broader level suggests two causes for 
the increase in CASREPs. One is the high replacement rate of certain parts. The other 
is the increase in tech assists. The high replacement rate of the parts should be studied 
further with the “five whys” procedure of the cause-and-effect analysis. The quality of 
the spares, availability of the appropriate spares, and frequency of maintenance—all 
these things may be causes. Pareto Analysis will assist in finding the top CASREPs 
requisitions as documented in the RM&A Handbook 2004. The supply support factors 
for the reliability of any system are reliability of the item to be spared, quantity of items 
used, probability that a spare will be available when needed, criticality of item 
application with respect to mission success and, of course, cost. All these factors need 
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CASREPs occur not only because mounts are older. They also occur when there 
are no personnel trained for the technology available on the ship with the newly installed 
mounts. This necessitates personnel training before the ship is deployed. There are 
various year-round online enhancement training courses available. Such training is a 
prerequisite for reducing the number of CASREPs. Lack of expertise on ships suggests 
that personnel are not trained for the on-board maintenance or support of the 
overhauled mounts. This deficiency may be due to the fact that maintenance is 
outsourced. Current DoD trends about outsourcing are discussed further in 3.2.5.  If the 
maintenance and support for certain overhauls are outsourced, then the need for 
expertise on board may be deemed redundant and hence cut from funding. This 
reduced budgeting may result in the system itself bearing an unexpected burden due to 
unanticipated corrective maintenance especially during the first two years after Class B 
overhauls. An initiative for training improvement is in place. Technician enhancement 
training, TET, and gun technician enhancement training, GTET, are being conducted by 
Fleet Training and Support Center Atlantic (FTSCLANT). If TET and GTET have 
reduced the off-board tech assists, those reductions need to be substantiated. 
3.2 The Toolkit 
3.2.1 Theory of Constraints 
Clearly there exist conflicts originating from factors such as complexity, maturity, 
magnitude, and diversity of system baselines for the Phalanx CIWS. But, these 
constraints can be exploited to the advantage of the system. The Theory of Constraints 
suggests that in the presence of constraints, one should first identify the system 
constraints [Goldrat 2nd edition].  Next, one should decide how to exploit them. Thirdly, 
one should subordinate everything else to this decision. Lastly, removing the system 
constraints could solve the problem. If a constraint gets violated in any one of these 
steps, one should not let the inertia become another system constraint, but should go 
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3.2.2 Total Quality Management 
Total quality management (TQM) can be used in order to further isolate the 
possible problem areas and gain insight into them. In TQM, statistical process control 
(SPC) is commonly used for problem solving and continuous improvement. These tools 
are not substitutes for the judgment and the process expertise of the personnel. But, 
they help deal with the complexity of the system and turn raw data into applicable 
information. The SPC tools useful for analyzing and investigating the CIWS could be 
Pareto Analysis, Data Collection, and Cause-and-Effect Diagrams, to name a few [Apte 
2004]. 
3.2.3 Pareto Analysis 
Pareto Analysis is a systematic approach for identifying, ranking, and working to 
permanently eliminate problems. It focuses on important error sources. The 80/20 rule 
of this analysis, 80% of the problems are due to 20% of the causes, is frequently true 
with systems. The analysis is based on the premise that usually a small number of 
faults cause the majority of malfunctions. So, it helps to separate the vital few and trivial 
many. The recording of the data for Pareto Analysis is a useful exercise for 
understanding process characteristics. This analysis is also useful in vendor 
evaluations. To perform Pareto Analysis, first the classification of defect/problems to be 
monitored needs to be defined. The period of time over which assessment is to be 
made needs to be defined. After accumulating the frequency of occurrences of each 
class of defects/problems over the period, a histogram is drawn in the descending order 
of frequency of occurrences. This identifies the classes that constitute the majority of 
defect/problem occurrences.  Data collection and analysis strategies need to be settled 
upon at the offset. There needs to be agreement and clear reason for any data 
collection. The questions that might be asked are Why? What? Where? How much? 
When? How? Who? How long? 
3.2.4 Cause-and-Effect Analysis 
The Cause-and-Effect diagram is sometimes known as the fish-bone diagram or 
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cause-and effect diagram is also used to sort out the causes of the problem. 
Brainstorming sessions of groups of personnel involved is required. These sessions 
help identify complete lists of causes of the problem, and the relationship between 
causes and effects in a rational manner. The process of doing this educates everyone 
involved in the system regarding the causes and effects of the problem. 
3.2.5 Outsourcing 
The literature and current research in outsourcing indicates that outsourcing 
products, not service, is more advantageous to most systems. Outsourcing of the 
maintenance of a weapon system reduces the need for training of ship board personnel 
in certain maintenance procedures. This may lead to a reduction in the Ao of a weapons 
system due to importing outside maintenance expertise when systems go down.  Yet, 
the in-sourcing of certain services is crucial to the health of critical weapon systems. 
This was true in the past and is especially true here since the service involves a last-
ditch defense system. However, this approach may not be efficient and fiscally 
responsible in lieu of the current trends in DoD. As noted by Commander, U.S. Fleet 
Forces Command, Adm. William J. Fallon, “We can and will continue to exercise fiscal 
discipline in achieving combat readiness by undertaking a fundamental change in 
culture, one that incorporates a continual, rigorous evaluation of the costs in preparing 
for combat, and the assumptions that drive those costs” (Story Number NNS041001-09 
www.news.navy.mil). This initiative suggests that outsourcing of services—if it provides 
supportability at a reduced cost—needs to be researched further. 
3.2.6 Optimization 
Optimization is a tool that prescribes the “best” possible action to take under the 
assumptions of a formulated model. The model consists of a set of expressions 
allocating scarce resources among competing activities. Usually assumptions made for 
optimization models are severe compared to the ones existing in the real world. But, this 
is a powerful tool when a limited quantity of economic resources, such as labor, time, 
raw material and (most importantly) funds, are to be allocated. There may be more than 
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feasible solution. Each activity yields a return based on the set objectives. The solutions 
found, if any, can be subjected to “what if” analysis for the robustness of the data used. 
A typical mathematical model in optimization has a stated objective that is either to be 
maximized or minimized subject to the constraints caused by limitations. The solution to 
the model prescribes the optimal plan of action and rewards gained if this plan is 
implemented.  
3.3 Current Directions 
Data provided by, and communication with the Naval Seas System Command 
(NSSC) asserts that, until this year, there was a backlog for mount conversions to Block 
1B through Class A overhauls. The number of mounts overhauled was 5-6 per year. 
Yet, some research asserts the mounts need to be changed every 7 years to optimize 
their functionality [CIWS Funding History PEO Document]. This translates to about 40 
mounts per year. Due to lack of funding, less than 40 mounts per year were overhauled, 
and therefore, the level of maintenance decreased greatly. However, the importance 
and necessity of CIWS has been recognized. CIWS does what it was intended to do. 
The CIWS Block 1B system is particularly effective in surface mode. As far as leakers 
(missiles that can penetrate the outer AAW/ASUW shield) are concerned, CIWS is 
considered the terminal defense.  Though this has been the case for many years, 
appreciation for systems such as CIWS has been enhanced as the terrorist threat, as 
epitomized by the USS Cole, has emerged. The program now appears to have the 
congressional and other support necessary to improve system Ao. The current program 
funding allows the remaining 267 mounts to be converted to Block 1B through Class A 
overhauls. By FY10 CIWS is projected to “get well.” It will no longer be on “life-support,” 
and the average age of the mounts will decrease over the years. 
Valued Engineering Change Proposals (VECP) are incentive methods in 
production processes in which the producer modifies the existing process to improve 
efficiency and cost. This is done in consultation with the client so the benefits can be 
enjoyed by both parties: the client and the contractor. In the past, the contracting 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 25- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
processes. This new emphasis on collaboration has added to the flexibility of 
manufacturing and serviceability.  Various VECPs are in place and will be in production 
in FY05-06. During the process of Class A overhauls, these VECPs enhance the 
mounts at reduced cost. The OEM researches and develops enhancements (at no cost 
to the CIWS program) and implements the changes, upon approval, during production. 
The benefits, both of enhancement and savings, are shared.  
The CIWS program office requested that the Naval Warfare Support Center, 
Corona (NWSC/Corona) perform an independent logistic assessment (ILA) for CIWS. 
The report was produced in July 2004 but there are certain amendments still under 
consideration. This report will be available in October 2004 and should shed more light 
on future directions for CIWS. 
The current initiatives, such as implementation of Class A overhauls, funding for 
installation of Block 1B mounts, improvement of MTBF, and independent logistic 
assessment are steps in the right direction.  But as the hypergraph (Figure 1) describes, 
the scope of CIWS supportability is broad. To ensure that the system functions and 
delivers economically what it is designed and intended to deliver and uses the funds 
assigned in an optimal way, various studies are needed. The tools for these 
investigations may be derived from various subject areas. These subject areas were 
explained in the previous section. Yet, some of the necessary research studies using 
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4. Conclusion 
4.1 Future Research 
The analysis so far has arrived at the following hypothesis. The high cost of 
maintenance of CIWS, increase in CASREPs and tech assists leading to reduction of 
reliability, initiatives to increase and actual increases in MTBF, and unchanged Ao in 
spite of improved MTBF are all effects of causes that need added investigation. In fact, 
all the stated effects could form titles of research projects. The research studies that will 
be of importance to the life-cycle-support of CIWS are listed. Some of these are 
conceptual and others are specific.  
The root causes for the high cost of maintenance could be outsourcing of the 
support service and lack of preventive maintenance. Lack of preventive maintenance 
may be because of lack of resources (such as money and logistic support). High cost of 
corrective maintenance can be traced to increases in CASREPs and a high percentage 
of tech assists. High CASREPs are caused by lack of quality or unavailability of parts on 
board, which may also be due to logistic support. Lack of expertise and training are the 
foundational cause of tech assists, which can be again traced to outsourcing of 
maintenance. All the “cans” and “mays” need to be studied further.  
On the other hand, in the past, if a ship needed a repair it was accomplished at 
any cost. Learning from the “high-cost/low-availability” syndrome of this system, it will 
be beneficial to more specifically research the tradeoff between the escalating repair 
cost and the availability of that ship and/or system. However, analyzing the effects and 
costs of not performing necessary repairs is a common practice in the private industry. 
Should the same standards be applied to Defense? Should a new strategy of repair be: 
repair only if the system fails certain critical criteria, but not at any cost? Should a ship 
be run like a private enterprise? Should the person in charge of the ship also be 
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The PEO IWS office has projected that data on the results and effects of Class A 
overhauls will be available in 2005. This data should be analyzed to validate this 
initiative. Funding for Block 1B is available, but an optimal schedule needs to be set that 
will achieve the objective of improving Ao for CIWS using the least amount of monetary 
resources.  Likewise, simply the availability of funds does not guarantee the installation 
of modifications and upgrading of the fleet. The initiatives to improve MTBF also have to 
be validated for the “biggest bang for the buck.” The sample points, at this writing, are 
too few to draw any conclusive trend. But, as the data becomes available, a study 
conducted to validate the implementation of these overhauls will help document the 
lessons for CIWS support in the future.   
The diversification of CIWS baselines, which occurred over time, contributes to 
the high cost of maintenance. More baselines simply increased complexity. Several 
types of mounts need a wider variety of parts and people with different ship-board 
expertise. Logistics for a line of products that have a large variance is a complex state 
of affairs. Maintaining the inventory of and expertise for parts with diversity costs more. 
Some of this expansion is deliberate, whereas in some cases it is forced due to evolving 
security issues or strategy or both. In the case of CIWS, diversification occurred 
because of the system’s unique place in the weapon system and rapidly-changing 
defense needs. But there is a lesson to be learned here: diverse baselines have high 
variable costs.  
On the other hand, if there is only one baseline—a uniformity of parts to be 
stored and a unified way personnel are trained—then the economies of scale will bring 
costs down. However, there is benefit in starting small and expanding in scope and 
scale gradually. The spiraling concept, otherwise known as spiral development, can 
work economically without compromising operational availability. This process—
introducing a prototype or a small number of products and then gradually expanding the 
original product or enhancement through the fleet—propagates the product line in two 
dimensions, scale and scope, especially when the end product is not known. Some of 
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issues or strategy or both. Fixed cost is generally low, but a break-even analysis 
between uniform baselines and spiral development, addressing both initial and 
sustainment costs, should both be researched for future, as well as current, systems.  
A schedule for performing Class A overhauls for CIWS systems is in place until 
FY13. Scheduling is done based on various factors such as age of the mounts, status of 
the mount (Block 1 or Block 1A), availability of the ship, etc. The dynamic of this 
schedule changes as the requirements of the fleet change. Though at present there is a 
procedure and a schedule in place, use of optimization techniques will be necessary to 
find an optimal schedule. Design of the optimal schedule for Class A overhauls will be 
subject to the constraints of the following conditions, including but not limited to: older 
mounts converted first, availability of ships, available budget, and uniform mounts. 
There are numerous MTBF initiatives in place. Each initiative is associated with 
its cost and improvement. The optimization model known as “knapsack problem” (or a 
version of that) will help uncover the optimal plan of action.  
The conclusions of this report suggest there is a need for more in-depth studies, 
research and investigation. Such studies need to be completed for the benefit of the 
current status of CIWS as well as future sustainment/life-cycle support trade-offs. 
Lessons learned from CIWS can benefit future acquisitions of weapon systems 
and their maintenance.   
4.2 Funding Initiatives 
As the mounts in the Phalanx weapon system are converted, they need to be 
maintained. The fact is that for maintainability, logistic support is an economic and 
essential part of the system. Therefore, it is critical that operation and maintenance 
(OMN) receive the necessary funding. 
Additionally, though CIWS has been funded for Class A overhauls, there is no 
funding available for research and development. Yet, history suggests that as the needs 
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transformations from Block 0 to Block 1B. Therefore, exploration of potential future 
trends and investigation of possible changes CIWS may need to undergo is critical. An 
R & D line would have been beneficial for the life-cycle support of CIWS. However, at 
present or in the future, if CIWS is to be replaced by the Rolling Airframe Missile, then 
the allocation of past—but not future—R & D funding can be rationalized.  
In summary, the research studies, analysis of lessons learned, and forecast of 
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